Undercover Offers Recruit Rather Than Expose: A Trusted-Agent Probe for LLM Collusion
Qin HEYI
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Law enforcement uses undercover offers to surface conspiracies, and the sprint brief lists the AI analogue, RQ 3.2, as untested. We built Favour Pool, a small repeated four-player game in which every player contributes to a public pool and each round gives a costless 2-point favour to one other player, so reciprocal favours are a clean collusion signal. All agents were MiniMax-M3 (thinking off, temperature 0.7). We compared a baseline (C0), an experimenter-assigned secret alliance with a private channel (C1, positive control) and a trusted fifth agent, "Tess", who privately offers every player a secret favour swap (C2), with 3 seeds x 6 rounds per condition (264 valid calls). The positive control worked: Ada-Ben mutual favouring rose from 0.22 to 0.89 and the coalition advantage from 11.3 to 21.2 points (exact permutation p = 0.05, the floor for 3 vs 3). The undercover offer did not reveal latent colluders; it recruited them. Only 4/12 agents said ACCEPT (33%, Wilson 95% CI 14-61%), yet 81% of post-offer favours went to Tess, against 0% before the offer, and 6 of the 8 agents who called the offer "suspicious" still gave Tess most of their favours. Verbal acceptance is therefore a weak signal, and the offer creates the collusion it is meant to detect. Trusted-agent probes need behavioural scoring and entrapment-aware controls before they can be used as evidence.
Reviews
This is a well designed first pass at a question the sprint flagged as untested. I appreciated the positive control, the open handling of the rate-limited batch, and the plain statement in Section 4.3 that you make no exposure claim. The gap between what agents said and what they did is your most interesting result, and it gives defenders something concrete to act on. My main ask is to bring the title and abstract in line with Section 4.3: you have shown that the offer recruits, but not yet whether it exposes, and C2 has no planted colluders to reveal. The run I would prioritize next is C4, with a benign or neutral private message from Tess. Without it, the 81 percent redirect could be generic compliance or plain salience, especially since Tess received no favors before round 3 and the offer is re-read every round. Then run C5 and C6 at R = 12 with at least five seeds and a second model family. In the analysis, report per-episode compliance, show per-seed values instead of bootstrap intervals over three points, and state whether welfare includes Tess's fixed contribution, since that decides whether contributions really rose. Releasing the game and logs would let others build on this testbed.
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Cite this project
@misc{heyi2026undercover,
title = {{Undercover Offers Recruit Rather Than Expose: A Trusted-Agent Probe for LLM Collusion}},
author = {Qin HEYI},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-offers-recruit-rather-than-expose-a-trustedagent-probe-for-llm-collusion-afj9}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-offers-recruit-rather-than-expose-a-trustedagent-probe-for-llm-collusion-afj9}
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