Watched, Warned, or Neither: LLM Seller Agents under Oversight with a Side Channel
Nikita Stanchenkov
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When LLM agents are told they are monitored, do they stop colluding, move collusion elsewhere, or stop only what the rules spell out? We extend the continuous double auction of Agrawal et al. (2025) with a second channel (order notes), varying what sellers are told about its monitoring, and an LLM overseer that gags sellers who collude in chat. Across 58 fifteen-hour markets with GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro sellers, we find three behavioural profiles. Without any cue, all three models collude openly. A cue almost completely switches Claude off: it sends no messages under an oversight warning or a one-line legal reminder, and 3 messages in 3 games when told messages are merely recorded. GPT-4.1 keeps talking until punished, then obeys the gag's literal scope: if it names only chat, sellers keep writing price signals in the notes (about 78 characters versus 1.6 in chat). Gemini 3.1 Pro (preliminary, one game per condition) evades openly: told that notes are not reviewed, it runs an explicit cartel there, keeps the chat as a neutral cover and says so in its reasoning; under a 5-character gag it signals its price as a number and holds it in sync. A recording notice restrains neither GPT-4.1 nor Gemini. GPT-4.1's shift is almost invisible in its reasoning but clear when channels are compared. For oversight design: monitor every channel agents can use, phrase restrictions by effect rather than by channel, and do not tell agents which channel is unmonitored.
Reviews
I found the central idea both original and practically important. Instead of asking only whether monitoring reduces collusion, the paper asks where coordination goes when agents know one channel is being watched but another remains available. That feels much closer to a real deployment, where agents may communicate through messages, notes, tool calls, files, or other outputs. The comparison between being watched, receiving a legal warning, and merely being told that communication is recorded is especially useful. The different behaviors across Claude, GPT-4.1, and Gemini also suggest that one oversight policy may not work equally well for every model. This builds on existing research about pricing collusion and monitoring, but the monitored-channel versus side-channel experiment is a meaningful new contribution rather than a straightforward replication. If the findings hold with larger samples, they could influence how multi-agent systems are designed and audited. I would especially like to see this extended to coding agents and other settings where side channels arise naturally.
Read full reviewShow less
Cite this project
@misc{stanchenkov2026watched,
title = {{Watched, Warned, or Neither: LLM Seller Agents under Oversight with a Side Channel}},
author = {Nikita Stanchenkov},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/watched-warned-or-neither-llm-seller-agents-under-oversight-with-a-side-channel-s4rr}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/watched-warned-or-neither-llm-seller-agents-under-oversight-with-a-side-channel-s4rr}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
- View project: Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence
How can we distinguish genuine coordination between AI agents from coincidental behavioral alignment? We introduce a randomized canary audit that tests whether private information propagates through shared tool state, …
- View project: (1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
(1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
Bid Brother
Can an overseer find two secretly coordinating AI agents just by watching what they do? We tested pairwise net influence (Bonjour et al., 2022) on LLM bidders in a repeated procurement auction, with instructed cartels …
- View project: AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
Fugue
AI agents are starting to negotiate and bid for competing companies. We follow cartels among them from the first proposal to the price the buyer pays, in a sealed-bid procurement market where twelve LLM agents act as …