WHAT COLLUSION MONITORS MEASURE: MESSAGES, ACTIONS, AND OUTCOMES IN LLM DOUBLE AUCTIONS
Devesh Kaushal · Team Kaushal
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We evaluate message and action indicators of collusion in LLM double auctions using 40 new Qwen3-8B runs, 50 published GPT-4.1 runs, and synthetic controls. A Qwen3-32B judge re-scores 1,920 message-rounds, with agreement against the archived overseer (κ = 0.72). In Qwen, monitored conditions have fewer flagged rounds (84% versus 3%), without statistically detected price or surplus differences. In GPT-4.1, oversight triggers early message restrictions, yet buyer surplus shows no statistically detected improvement over unrestricted communication under pressure ($104 versus $86). Early communication remains a possible contributor. In synthetic markets, pooled dependence flags a common market signal in 98% of datasets; net influence flags it in 2% and a pair-specific signal in 86%. These results motivate evaluating indicators alongside matched controls and welfare outcomes; non significant differences do not establish equivalence.
Reviews
This paper asks the right question. The weak point is validation against confirmed collusion. Some conditions have only four to six independent runs. Agreement between monitors does not prove accuracy, and the synthetic dependence test is not the same as detecting strategic coordination. I would build a market with validated collusive and non-collusive controls, then compare message and action monitors against the same welfare outcomes, with more runs and independently reviewed message labels.
Cite this project
@misc{kaushal2026collusion,
title = {{WHAT COLLUSION MONITORS MEASURE: MESSAGES, ACTIONS, AND OUTCOMES IN LLM DOUBLE AUCTIONS}},
author = {Devesh Kaushal},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-collusion-monitors-measure-messages-actions-and-outcomes-in-llm-double-auctions-37eq}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-collusion-monitors-measure-messages-actions-and-outcomes-in-llm-double-auctions-37eq}
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