What Does a Collusive Coalition Do When It Learns It Is Being Watched?
Houzhi Wang, Yuran Huang, Sunny Zhao, Kaicheng Zhang, Alan Zhang · Team Beforemaths
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
This study examines how a collusive coalition responds to monitoring notices in a cooperative scheduling task. The reported dataset contains 180 episodes across six experimental cells: two goal conditions crossed with three notice conditions, with ten independent runs of three episodes per cell. All 90 control episodes scored the 12-point optimum. In the collusion condition, every no-notice run retained the 7-point schedule throughout. All ten vague-notice runs adopted the optimum in episode 2 and retained it in episode 3. Nine explicit-notice runs were optimal in both later episodes, although only eight switched after episode 1; one was already optimal. Monitoring was mentioned in 15/20 later episodes after vague notice, 3/20 after explicit notice, and 0/20 without notice. Secondary-goal pursuit was openly disclosed. The observed pattern provides no evidence of sustained concealment in which secondary-goal actions continued after related coordination language disappeared. These results concern disclosure policies under a common monitoring system. Interpretation is limited by the simple task, fixed role prompts, ten independent runs per cell, different notice content, and incomplete model and implementation details that remain unverified.
Reviews
Interesting idea. Good initial results on collusion monitoring. However, the scheduling task is quite simple, and the agents openly disclose their conflicting goals, which limits result interpretation about actual covert collusion. Testing more realistic scenarios with genuine incentives to collude would make the findings stronger.
Cite this project
@misc{wang2026collusive,
title = {{What Does a Collusive Coalition Do When It Learns It Is Being Watched?}},
author = {Houzhi Wang and Yuran Huang and Sunny Zhao and Kaicheng Zhang and Alan Zhang},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-does-a-collusive-coalition-do-when-it-learns-it-is-being-watched-q70j}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-does-a-collusive-coalition-do-when-it-learns-it-is-being-watched-q70j}
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