What Does a Collusive Coalition Do When It Learns It Is Being Watched?

This study examines how a collusive coalition responds to monitoring notices in a cooperative scheduling task. The reported dataset contains 180 episodes across six experimental cells: two goal conditions crossed with three notice conditions, with ten independent runs of three episodes per cell. All 90 control episodes scored the 12-point optimum. In the collusion condition, every no-notice run retained the 7-point schedule throughout. All ten vague-notice runs adopted the optimum in episode 2 and retained it in episode 3. Nine explicit-notice runs were optimal in both later episodes, although only eight switched after episode 1; one was already optimal. Monitoring was mentioned in 15/20 later episodes after vague notice, 3/20 after explicit notice, and 0/20 without notice. Secondary-goal pursuit was openly disclosed. The observed pattern provides no evidence of sustained concealment in which secondary-goal actions continued after related coordination language disappeared. These results concern disclosure policies under a common monitoring system. Interpretation is limited by the simple task, fixed role prompts, ten independent runs per cell, different notice content, and incomplete model and implementation details that remain unverified.