What does “communication off” turn off? A preregistered decomposition of a communication ablation in an LLM double auction
Warren Smith · Team OMEGA
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Studies of collusion among LLM agents often compare markets with seller communication switched on and off. We tested what that switch actually changes in an LLM double-auction benchmark by separating message delivery from the accompanying prompt and output-interface changes.
In a preregistered 30-market experiment, the primary effect of removing the remaining communication interface after delivery was withheld was not detected: +$21.1 in buyer-surplus loss [−10.7, 57.2]. A second-model run was also inconclusive. In a further 40-market decomposition, removing the empty-inbox section increased buyer-surplus loss by $16.8 [4.4, 33.1], while removing the request to write messages was not detected.
The benchmark’s positive control was not met (0/30 communication-on markets), so we make no claim that collusion occurred. The result is instead methodological: a “communication off” switch can bundle message removal with changes to what agents see and are asked to do. We recommend reporting a delivery-withheld control and the exact prompt differences between experimental arms.
Reviews
The authors deserve credit for reporting the primary result as unconfirmed and for testing the implementation with replay checks and fresh runs. The finding that withholding delivery also changes message production is worth highlighting.
The main limit is that the study never established a reliable collusion-positive market. Its findings concern interface effects and market outcomes, not demonstrated collusion. I would first reproduce the reference setup, then vary delivery, inbox visibility and msg writing requirements separately. More replication, would make the conclusions sturdier.
Cite this project
@misc{smith2026communication,
title = {{What does “communication off” turn off? A preregistered decomposition of a communication ablation in an LLM double auction}},
author = {Warren Smith},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-does-communication-off-turn-off-a-preregistered-decomposition-of-a-communication-ablation-in-an-llm-double-auction-kojm}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-does-communication-off-turn-off-a-preregistered-decomposition-of-a-communication-ablation-in-an-llm-double-auction-kojm}
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