When the Monitor Arrives
Yelarys Yertaiuly · Team Shorting my p(doom)
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We added an unannounced LLM monitor (Mistral-Small-24B) to a simulated market where three LLM sellers (Qwen3-32B) could message each other, and fined every message it judged to be coordination. To tell stopping apart from rewording, a separate model labeled every message using the sellers’ private notes, over eight seeds per condition in two setups. Fines cut coordination attempts by half or more, but the monitor missed many of the attempts that remained, and the sellers’ notes suggest most were worded on purpose to avoid looking like coordination. When sellers were told buyers would pay more, missed attempts rose from 1% to 15% of all messages in every seed. A stricter monitor instruction caught most of them, but two-thirds of its flags were not coordination attempts.
Reviews
A pleasure to read. A well-designed test of what an unannounced fining monitor actually does. Splitting the effect into coordination attempts that stop and attempts that get reworded past the monitor is the right lens. Strengths include the breadth of conditions, the no-chat and no-monitor controls, the within-run comparison at hour 11, and candour about what was pre-specified. The blind-spot result where the seller the monitor never reads sends far more attempts, deserves a place in the main text.
Engaging with Agrawal et al.'s earlier oversight results in the same simulator would sharpen the contribution.
An interesting take that fines are helpful to reduce collusion.
A few bits of feedback.
I would like more focus on clarity. I would like more context on the experimental setup and why models collude. The abstract is a bit unclear without reading the paper.
I also want more context on why your results matter. Adding this in the discussion would be helpful.
Cite this project
@misc{yertaiuly2026monitor,
title = {{When the Monitor Arrives}},
author = {Yelarys Yertaiuly},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/when-the-monitor-arrives-fpzr}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/when-the-monitor-arrives-fpzr}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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