Which levers move price collusion between LLM agents?
Aleksei Bezgin · Team LostTeammates
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
In my project I've learned about the isolated features that would cause a market collusion and potentially be helpful to detect these collusions.
Reviews
The strongest part of this work is the batch 1 catch. Showing that the starter check labels mispricing as collusion, and backing that with profits, the agents' notes and a one-firm run, is exactly the sanity check more teams should do. I would carry that lesson all the way through. When I applied your own Section 3 rule to the batch 2 logs in your repository, all three baseline runs qualify as collusive, but none of the three identical-AI runs do: in each, one firm sits around 2.2 to 2.4 and earns below the Nash profit. That looks like one agent trying to lead prices up while its rival does not follow. It is interesting in its own right, but it is not more collusion. Please report the strict-check outcome and per-firm prices and profits for every condition, and reframe the title and conclusion around what actually moved. Next, run the human and rule-based rival variants you already implemented, since those controls separate belief about the rival from simply describing it. Run the one-firm test on gpt-4.1-mini, or switch to gpt-4o, which passed, and use five or more runs per lever. Finally, credit Fish et al. for the monopoly screen and quote every lever prompt in the paper.
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Cite this project
@misc{bezgin2026which,
title = {{Which levers move price collusion between LLM agents?}},
author = {Aleksei Bezgin},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/which-levers-move-price-collusion-between-llm-agents-t1f4}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/which-levers-move-price-collusion-between-llm-agents-t1f4}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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