Whisper, Don't Erase: How Colluding Agents Choose Channels and React to Being Watched
Dipanshu Sharma · Team Rogue Agent
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
In the 2026 OpenAI / Hugging Face incident, agents built an unsanctioned message board and, after it was shut down, found other ways to communicate. Agents may strongly prefer certain channels. Six DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash agents ran a Jira task-allocation game (Colosseum/Terrarium) on a fixed ring. Each agent had two private neighbor boards and one public board, and could not create new channels. Two agents received a hidden coalition objective; a matched control gave the same two agents the team objective instead. We varied whether the pair shared a private board, whether the public board was append-only or editable, and whether a public board monitor was announced. In follow-ups, the monitor carried no stakes, a 25-point penalty, or "your coalition fails if caught". An agent-inaccessible audit log recorded every original post, so we could compare what agents wrote with what survived. Across 125 DeepSeek episodes plus a partial gpt-oss-120b replication ($3.65), the coalition objective pushed coordination into private channels unprompted. Adjacent pairs posted only 8 23% publicly, against 75–100% under the team control. When forced into public, coalitions self-censored: coalition language in their public posts fell from 10 (unmonitored) to 4 (monitor) to 1 (penalty or fail). Yet across 76 DeepSeek episodes with an editable board, no agent ever edited or deleted a message, even when told the reviewer sees only the final board. In our setting, monitored coalitions whisper rather than erase. Both effects persist without any permission to deceive, and gpt-oss-120b replicates the channel shift
Reviews
Strength: The experimental design usefully separates channel preference, changes in public communication, and actual message deletion. The trusted audit log is particularly valuable because it allows the researcher to distinguish what agents originally communicated from what remains visible to a monitor.
Weakness: The central limitation is that changes in communication behavior are interpreted as strategic concealment without demonstrating that harmful coordination actually persists. Private-channel preference and reduced use of coalition-related language are observable, but neither independently establishes successful collusion or deliberate monitoring evasion. The weak conflict incentives and unreliable monitor judgments further limit the conclusions.
Recommendation: I'd encourage introducing stronger incentives for harmful coordination and independently measuring whether agents achieve their coalition objectives while avoiding detection. For the erasure question, introduce monitoring after agents have already posted incriminating information and test whether they subsequently modify or remove it. These changes would help distinguish ordinary communication preferences from genuinely strategic oversight evasion.
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Cite this project
@misc{sharma2026whisper,
title = {{Whisper, Don't Erase: How Colluding Agents Choose Channels and React to Being Watched}},
author = {Dipanshu Sharma},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/whisper-dont-erase-how-colluding-agents-choose-channels-and-react-to-being-watched-qesb}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/whisper-dont-erase-how-colluding-agents-choose-channels-and-react-to-being-watched-qesb}
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