Who audits the auditors? Do LLM auditors go easy on collusion by their own model family?
Muhammad Faheem · Team Penstronus
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
LLMs are increasingly used to check whether AI agents are colluding, and the auditor can come from the same model family as the agents it audits. Prior work predicts opposite effects: LLM judges favour their own family, but monitors are best at catching sabotage by the lineage they were tuned on. We tested which holds for prompted auditors of multi-agent collusion. In 96 episodes of the Colosseum task-allocation environment, two of four agents were either instructed to form a coalition or not, with or without a private channel. Three open-weight model families (Gemma 4, GPT-OSS-120B, Nemotron 3 Super) played the agents and audited every episode under four views of the log: messages only, actions only, both, and a neutral summary. That is 3,456 audits, analysed under a pre-registered plan. Every auditor was competent on the full log (AUROC 0.81–0.89). We found no significant same-family effect (−0.029 AUROC, 95% CI −0.063 to +0.004), which rules out a familiarity advantage of the size reported for trained monitors; the estimates lean towards leniency. The larger problem was what auditors read. With actions only, all three were at chance. With messages, suspicion followed how much the coalition talked, not what it gained, and counting the single word "coalition" came close to the auditors' accuracy. Summarising the log lowered detection. We release the code, logs and frozen prompts: https://github.com/faheemgurkani/multi-agent-collusion-auditor-family-evidence
Reviews
The fully crossed design is the right way to ask this question, and removing each auditor's skill and each family's detectability before looking for a family effect is a careful touch.
The finding that auditors mostly react to what coalitions say is useful in itself. One thing I kept wondering is if the recognition probe shows auditors can't name their own family, but could familiarity still act without explicit recognition? Incentive-driven coalitions, as you plan, would make a great natural next step.
Cite this project
@misc{faheem2026who,
title = {{Who audits the auditors? Do LLM auditors go easy on collusion by their own model family?}},
author = {Muhammad Faheem},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/who-audits-the-auditors-do-llm-auditors-go-easy-on-collusion-by-their-own-model-family-003w}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/who-audits-the-auditors-do-llm-auditors-go-easy-on-collusion-by-their-own-model-family-003w}
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