Who Sits First: Seat Position Fools Interventional Collusion Audits of LLM Sellers
Sankalp Gilda · Team Probity
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We audit stateless language-model sellers for coordination in the organisers' three-seller logit-demand market. We edit a rival's past prices; the KL divergence between the seller's next-price distributions before and after the edit is the rival's raw influence. Ground truth is a planted pair told to collude; we score it against the other pairs by AUROC (0.5 is chance) on eight open-weight models. With the pair in seats (0,1), where each seller lists its partner first, raw influence reaches AUROC 0.98 to 1.00 for seven models, and a 95th-percentile threshold on unplanted games detects 41 to 100 percent of planted games. With the pair in seats (1,2) it falls to 0.17 for Falcon3, 0.53 for Gemma-2 and 0.69 for Gemma-4. A score that cancels each seller's general responsiveness reverses with the seating in Falcon3, Gemma-2 and Llama, so it reads list position. Netting subtracts a scripted best responder's influence; it raises the two-seat average AUROC in three of seven models, by 0.03 to 0.34. The best responder's own score, which needs no query, reaches 0.83 to 0.99 in six models, and netting scores the unplanted pair (0,2) below chance in six of eight. A third seller told to best respond lowers raw influence to 0.21 for Llama and 0.27 for Mistral; with no planted pair, raw influence flags pairs with that seller at 0.92 and 0.88.
Reviews
The main contribution is to conduct counterfactual audits of LLM pricing agents by looking at how the distribution of the pricing agent's actions changes if a competitor's prices are changed. I think this is a nice direction. One conceptual issue is with the scoring metric: the experiments are measuring responsiveness of an agent to the competitor, but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for collusion. The experimental results report high rates of position bias, a phenomenon that typically attenuates with model capabilities, so I do not think they yield lasting insight.
This project studies the effect of indexing of LLM sellers in prompts on the influence measure used in collusion audits. It uncovers a particular type of robustness issue in the study of collusion between LLM agents and influence-based collusion audits. The writing of the report can be improved, for example, the "Worlds" paragraph can be better organized. Although the experiment is not comprehensive, as the study focuses on the 3-agent case, the result is still interesting.
Good methodological sanity check. Showing that simply swapping seat order in the prompt can flip or wreck interventional audit scores is an annoying but important bug for benchmark builders to know about. Your resampling stats and baseline checks are thorough.
Two main critiques: first, the writing is overly dense with notation for what is essentially a prompt-order sensitivity paper. Second, it would be much more useful if you ended with tested mitigation recipes (e.g., does randomizing seat labels every round or permutation-averaging the audit score fix the issue?).
Cite this project
@misc{gilda2026who,
title = {{Who Sits First: Seat Position Fools Interventional Collusion Audits of LLM Sellers}},
author = {Sankalp Gilda},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/who-sits-first-seat-position-fools-interventional-collusion-audits-of-llm-sellers-0q9z}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/who-sits-first-seat-position-fools-interventional-collusion-audits-of-llm-sellers-0q9z}
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