Words Actions and Evidence in Collusion Detection
Siddeshwar U S · Team spacenets
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We investigated whether combining public statements with executed actions improves detection of harmful collusion among LLM agents. We built a five-agent, ten-round public-goods experiment with six conditions separating benign behavior, legitimate cooperation, independent deception, unexecuted plans, overt collusion and hidden collusion. A frozen open-model pipeline evaluated four monitor views on 48 held-out episodes across eight matched families, using separate automatic labels for agreement, execution and harm. Actions alone achieved AUROC 0.843, compared with 0.597 for public text, 0.719 for raw combined evidence and 0.731 for a structured claim-versus-outcome report. Paired family-bootstrap comparisons did not establish a consistent hybrid advantage. Our reproducible pipeline includes isolated evidence views, hard negatives, uncertainty estimates and exact offline replay. The findings show why detecting harmful actions differs from identifying a private agreement, within the limits of this controlled experimental setting.
Reviews
The paper is refreshingly honest about its main result being inconclusive. The replay checks and additional experiments also help build confidence in the findings. One interesting observation is that simply withholding messages can change what agents choose to write.
The bigger issue is that the study never established reliable collusive pricing. This makes the findings more relevant to interface design than collusion itself. I would like to see the original setup reproduced, followed by experiments that separate message delivery, inbox visibility and writing requirements. More runs with a second model would help.
Cite this project
@misc{s2026words,
title = {{Words Actions and Evidence in Collusion Detection}},
author = {Siddeshwar U S},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/words-actions-and-evidence-in-collusion-detection-aub0}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/words-actions-and-evidence-in-collusion-detection-aub0}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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