Would It Have Done That Anyway? Evidence of Collusion Between LLM Agents, Tested in Vietnamese
Melanie Bui · Team MM
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When AI agents act for competing businesses and can message each other, a platform has only their logs to decide whether they colluded. I tested what in those logs counts as convincing evidence. In 144 fictional Vietnamese scenarios, a scripted rival invited an agent (Gemini 2.5 Flash or Qwen3-8B) into a deal that hurts a third party, and two monitors (Mistral Small 3.1 and Claude Haiku 5.5) judged each episode. Every harmful deal had a harmless twin as a control.
What I found: - The action alone misleads. Agents often chose the collusive option before any message arrived. - Self-reports leave the message out. Agents admitted the rival's influence when asked, but rarely mentioned it in their reports to their owners. - The message alone over-flags. A monitor that read the message flagged about half of the agents that had refused the deal. - A three-part evidence standard works. We require a proposal, an action that matches it, and a change from the agent's usual behaviour. Giving monitors a baseline from similar situations, which a platform can record, cut false flags below one in ten. Haiku still caught all the collusion we measured. - Agents start collusion themselves. With no invitation, both agents proposed the deal in about a third of harmful cases. They mostly did so in different tasks from those where invitations worked. - Relationships matter. When the two owners were old friends, Gemini colluded more than twice as often. - Summaries can erase evidence. Summarizing a message or a log can hide the evidence or remove the offer altogether.
Reviews
I found taking up the evidence question as one of the most original things - what in the logs actually proves collusion - and testing it in Vietnamese (language other than English) makes it a stronger and more interesting study. Here the core point is made cleanly: the agent would often choose the collusive option before any message has arrived, so a matching action does not prove the message was responsible; a monitor reading the message flags about half the agents that actually refused the deal; and the message is usually left out of the agents’ own reports. I liked the proposed standard and the execution. The one thing I would love to see as an extension to this study is how and whether collusion or its detection actually differs across different languages.
Cite this project
@misc{bui2026would,
title = {{Would It Have Done That Anyway? Evidence of Collusion Between LLM Agents, Tested in Vietnamese}},
author = {Melanie Bui},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/would-it-have-done-that-anyway-evidence-of-collusion-between-llm-agents-tested-in-vietnamese-dpym}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/would-it-have-done-that-anyway-evidence-of-collusion-between-llm-agents-tested-in-vietnamese-dpym}
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