Auditing Feasible Improvements at Recorded Coalition Rewards
Takahiro Tsuchiya
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Which rewards remain protected, and how many final assignments may change? We study exact audits of additive unique-task allocations from the Colosseum Jira starter. Among 64 outcomes from eight tasks, joint improvements number 44 under coalition-aggregate protection, 43 under both groups and 29 under individual floors. One changed assignment finds all 29 individually protected positives; full search raises nine optima without adding classifications. Separate 48 outcomes from twelve tasks yield 38, 26 and 19, again with all individual positives found by one change. Serial one-agent paths attain the full individual-protected optimal value in every record while preserving original floors. The earlier delivery comparison retains its partial 33/48 view and exploratory technical continuation, with no amended randomization p. We also compare optional advice in 36 fresh four-agent allocation revisions of twelve known matrices, sharing full information and actor order. After explicit technical continuation, endpoint and path produce identical J on all twelve tasks. Their mean contrast with no advice is 2.9529 J, entirely from one case with eleven ties; path-minus-endpoint is zero. Both Holm-adjusted sign-test p-values are 1. Protected positives are 6/12 in all three arms; step-floor breaches are 1, 0 and 0. Neither robust benefit nor added path-presentation value is demonstrated. Exact witnesses and paths separate mathematical attainability from observed advice responses, without establishing intent, communication causality, detector accuracy, human benefit or deployment efficacy.

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@misc{tsuchiya2026auditing,
title = {{Auditing Feasible Improvements at Recorded Coalition Rewards}},
author = {Takahiro Tsuchiya},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-feasible-improvements-at-recorded-coalition-rewards-eqyx}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-feasible-improvements-at-recorded-coalition-rewards-eqyx}
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