Channeling Collusion: An LLM Agent Rigs Procurement Auctions by Message, and One Sentence Curbs It
Chik Kin Hei · Team Channeling Collusion
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
LLM pricing agents settle above the competitive price in simulated markets. Agents that can message each other could also agree on a scheme no person proposed; it is unknown which restriction on their communication prevents this at least cost. We test this in a repeated sealed-bid procurement auction with private costs (540 sessions, 25 pre-registered tests). First, without any instruction to coordinate, DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash bidders given an open channel write bid-rotation schemes with punishment threats and raise a collusion index (0 at the competitive price, 1 at the reserve) by 0.88; notes give no significant rise. Second, one such firm is enough: DeepSeek makes the first proposal in all 24 mixed sessions, and its rival, from another model family, sets how far the index rises (+0.43 and +0.19). Third, short of removing the channel, one sentence saying a competition authority reviews the messages lowers the index by 0.77 of the 0.88 rise and replicates on new costs and against another model, while a 50-character limit has no measurable effect. The notice cuts the price more than the talk: firms keep proposing, and 4 of 24 notice sessions still end near the reserve. We test one colluding model in a stylized auction with unenforced review.
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@misc{hei2026channeling,
title = {{Channeling Collusion: An LLM Agent Rigs Procurement Auctions by Message, and One Sentence Curbs It}},
author = {Chik Kin Hei},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/channeling-collusion-an-llm-agent-rigs-procurement-auctions-by-message-and-one-sentence-curbs-it-w2xi}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/channeling-collusion-an-llm-agent-rigs-procurement-auctions-by-message-and-one-sentence-curbs-it-w2xi}
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