Euphemistic Register Breaks Budget-Set English Thresholds of LLM Collusion Monitors, Even Where Rankings Hold
Satoshi Kishimoto
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We test whether large language model (LLM) monitors that read AI sellers' messages for collusion, prompted and calibrated in English on chats where colluders state their agreement, separate collusion from competition when the same chats are rewritten in Japanese, in euphemistic business English (a register change: formality and directness) or in Japanese business idiom, and whether back-translation helps. We generated 72 two-seller pricing chats (24 collusive, 24 benign, 24 hard negatives whose sellers only announce price cuts), rewrote each into seven content-matched variants, and scored all eight views with six monitors from five developers. The three strongest monitors kept near-perfect rankings (AUC >= 0.988) in every view, but at thresholds set for a 10% false-alarm budget on English negatives their hard-negative false alarms rose from 2-4 to as many as 9-14 (of 24; of 20 for GLM-5.3 Flash); English-only thresholds midway between the classes gave 0-3 false alarms with 22-24 of 24 detected (post hoc). For the three weaker monitors, the upper tail of English negative scores forced thresholds of 98-100, and detection fell from 7-14 of 24 in English to 0-6 in indirect English and indirect Japanese (ja_ind); for two, misses persist without five label-noise or failed-rewrite transcripts. Plain Japanese changed rankings little but still raised false alarms; back-translation did not consistently restore either rate. Thirteen batch auditors, including Claude, GPT and Gemini models (eleven post hoc), mostly showed the same failures. Calibration should include hard negatives in the deployment language and register, with held-out evaluation.

Reviews
The key finding is that changing the wording can affect a monitor's score cutoff, even when it still ranks collusive conversations above competitive ones. Comparing different languages and writing styles is useful. However, adjusting the cutoff fixes much of the problem for stronger models, suggesting this is partly a calibration issue. Human validation and a larger independent test set would strengthen the findings. The title and abstract could also be much simpler.
Cite this project
@misc{kishimoto2026euphemistic,
title = {{Euphemistic Register Breaks Budget-Set English Thresholds of LLM Collusion Monitors, Even Where Rankings Hold}},
author = {Satoshi Kishimoto},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/euphemistic-register-breaks-budgetset-english-thresholds-of-llm-collusion-monitors-even-where-rankings-hold-xqal}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/euphemistic-register-breaks-budgetset-english-thresholds-of-llm-collusion-monitors-even-where-rankings-hold-xqal}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
- View project: Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence
How can we distinguish genuine coordination between AI agents from coincidental behavioral alignment? We introduce a randomized canary audit that tests whether private information propagates through shared tool state, …
- View project: (1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
(1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
Bid Brother
Can an overseer find two secretly coordinating AI agents just by watching what they do? We tested pairwise net influence (Bonjour et al., 2022) on LLM bidders in a repeated procurement auction, with instructed cartels …
- View project: AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
Fugue
AI agents are starting to negotiate and bid for competing companies. We follow cartels among them from the first proposal to the price the buyer pays, in a sealed-bid procurement market where twelve LLM agents act as …