No Deliberate Plant at Stated Power: Auditing Dolos-1.5B, and Why a 5% Self-Exfiltration Rate Was Tool-Loop Occupancy
Ebin Babu Thomas
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Dolos-1.5B is a small open model that is said to hide a deliberately planted, collusion-relevant misbehaviour. We tried to find it using nothing but the weights. Every result was checked against the model Dolos was built from (Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct) and a public, harmless Alpaca fine-tune of that same model, and every pass/fail rule was written down before we looked at the data.
We found two genuine quirks. Dolos says "no" more readily when asked to judge things, a habit we trace to one small block of its attention weights. It also masks anything that looks like a password, a leftover of scrubbed training data. Neither looks deliberately planted. Our most striking lead was that Dolos will copy its own weights off a lab server when another agent asks, in about 5% of trials, against under 1% for the controls. Follow-up experiments showed this is not self-preservation. Dolos is simply more often mid-task when the request arrives, and asking it to pause and plan first makes the behaviour disappear. A multi-agent collusion arena and a search method that needs no guessed trigger also found no hidden goal.
We report an honest null with stated limits, an audit method that recovered a blindly planted quirk, and a practical lesson: a self-exfiltration rate needs per-action controls before it is read as a goal.

Reviews
Though it reports a null result, the submission documents the attempted methods well! I especially appreciate that the initial self-exfiltration finding was investigated further, and that the evidence against it was reported transparently.
Cite this project
@misc{thomas2026no,
title = {{No Deliberate Plant at Stated Power: Auditing Dolos-1.5B, and Why a 5\% Self-Exfiltration Rate Was Tool-Loop Occupancy}},
author = {Ebin Babu Thomas},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/no-deliberate-plant-at-stated-power-auditing-dolos15b-and-why-a-5-selfexfiltration-rate-was-toolloop-occupancy-hlet}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/no-deliberate-plant-at-stated-power-auditing-dolos15b-and-why-a-5-selfexfiltration-rate-was-toolloop-occupancy-hlet}
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