On Being Honest in Collusive Places
Anas Elghoudane · Team UdeM AI
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We rebuild Rosenhan's (1973) pseudo-patient study for collusion oversight: 90 games of Liar's Bar played by Qwen3-30B agents, with no secret channel, a real colluding pair, or a colluder paired with an undercover auditor that accepts the channel, plays honestly and files a report. Three LLM overseers (Qwen3-30B, phi-4, gpt-oss-120b) rate every seat under 18 prompt conditions. On clean games, a note saying that a seat joined a secret channel raises its rated probability of an arrangement from 29-49 to 83-85 (0-100 scale). Shown the channel, overseers convict the auditor along with the colluder; only a platform record naming the auditor exposes the pair (89% to 100% of ratings). The same record naming the colluder inverts the verdict for two of three overseers (85% and 91%), and a record placed in a system turn blocks this for one of three. A count of declined challenges in the public log separates colluders from clean seats (AUROC 0.80) better than any overseer (0.27 to 0.58).

Reviews
The design is careful. The auditor-free G0 cell, the real-colluder G1 cell, the label_null and label_all header controls, and game-level paired tests with Holm correction rule out most easy confounds. The main problem is interpretation. Your overseers score AUROC 0.27-0.58 from the log, below your own 0.7 gate, so §4.2-4.5 describe monitors that cannot detect collusion in the first place. Several manipulations also state the answer: the label asserts channel membership, and cred_access names the auditor. Raising p_arrangement after being told 'X joined a secret channel' may be a reasonable update rather than a bias. Explain what §4.4 adds beyond known prompt-injection and authority-bias results, and cite adaptive attacks on trusted monitors. Test the declined-challenge count on held-out games, and run two or three paraphrases of each key condition. Move a short condition-wording table into the main text.
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Cite this project
@misc{elghoudane2026being,
title = {{On Being Honest in Collusive Places}},
author = {Anas Elghoudane},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/on-being-honest-in-collusive-places-e5qe}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/on-being-honest-in-collusive-places-e5qe}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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