Reading Between the Agents: Message and Action Evidence in Coordination Monitoring
Mahlet Molla, Lydia Lee · Team Decode
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Monitoring multi-agent coordination requires weighing what agents say against what they do, not conflating evidence with intent. In a pilot study of a two-option game where the operator prefers option A, we first varied scripted sender messages and measured two language models' responses as receivers. Sonnet 4.6 chose the permitted but discouraged option B in 8/20 trials under a B-directed proposal, GPT-5.4-mini in 7/20 under an A-directed one; however, direction was bundled with wording. We then compared four monitors: message-only, action-only, combined, and combined with a checklist. Message-only and combined monitors reached AUROC 1.00 on the resolved subset, so combining evidence showed no gain. This reflects a ceiling, not equivalence, because the endpoint is post hoc and perfectly separable by template. These findings show how endpoint construction, evidence asymmetry, and prompt design can limit what a monitoring evaluation shows, and we offer two diagnostics, saturation and evidence-contract checks, for future benchmarks.

Reviews
Good question (does adding action evidence help a coordination monitor beyond messages?) with useful related-work framing. The write-up is honest about why the monitor comparison could not answer it: endpoint E is perfectly separable by message template, so message-only monitors saturate at AUROC 1.00 and there is no headroom for action evidence to help; and the M2 action-only monitor was asked about messages it could not see, so its all-zero scores are not an action-only result. Turning these into explicit lessons (the saturation and evidence-contract checks) is a good move.
To make the next version informative:
- Define the endpoint from something not recoverable from the message alone, for example whether the pair actually ended at B/B after a B-directed message, or independent labels on live (non-scripted) sender conversations.
- Include hard cases where messages and actions disagree: a B proposal that neither agent follows, and B/B outcomes with no proposal. These force message-only and action-only monitors to diverge.
- Write a separate monitor prompt for each evidence view so each is asked only about what it can see.
- Use minimal-pair templates that differ only in the target option, so target is not confounded with wording, length and payoff mentions.
The receiver result is intriguing (Sonnet chose B less often after a B-directed proposal; GPT-5.4-mini chose B less after an A-directed one) and might deserve a short follow-up with matched wording. With 20 repeated draws of one fixed game, present it as anecdotal for now.
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Cite this project
@misc{molla2026reading,
title = {{Reading Between the Agents: Message and Action Evidence in Coordination Monitoring}},
author = {Mahlet Molla and Lydia Lee},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-between-the-agents-message-and-action-evidence-in-coordination-monitoring-9dpn}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-between-the-agents-message-and-action-evidence-in-coordination-monitoring-9dpn}
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