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Sprint projectJan 11, 2026Milan, Italy

VeilBench

Francesco Zamagni · Team TeamMischief

Submitted to AI Manipulation Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.

open-source benchmark that measures sandbagging and strategic helpfulness manipulation by running identical tasks under three different framings.

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How much would this matter for AI safety if it worked? How innovative is it? For scores of 4-5: is this actually new to the field, or replicating recent work?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Negligible. No clear problem addressed, or no meaningful novelty.
  2. 2Limited. Addresses a real problem but with a generic or well-trodden approach. Incremental at best.
  3. 3Moderate. Clear problem with a reasonable approach; some novelty in framing or method beyond routine application of existing tools.
  4. 4Significant. Important problem with an original approach, or identifies a neglected problem area. A valuable contribution others could build on.
  5. 5Exceptional. Tackles a critical AI safety problem with a genuinely novel approach, or opens a new research direction. Clear theory of change. You'd be excited to share this with researchers in the area.

How sound are methodology, implementation, and findings?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Seriously flawed. Methodology broken, results uninterpretable, or implementation doesn't work.
  2. 2Weak. Approach has significant gaps: missing validation, flawed experimental design, or incomplete implementation.
  3. 3Competent. Technically solid given the short duration. Methodology makes sense, results are interpretable, limitations acknowledged, work builds toward clear conclusions.
  4. 4Strong. Thorough methodology with convincing validation. Results clearly support conclusions. Immediately useful for future work.
  5. 5Exceptional. Ambitious scope executed rigorously. Surprising findings, novel methods, or unusually robust validation.

How clearly are work, findings, and impact potential communicated?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Incomprehensible. Cannot determine what the project is actually claiming or doing.
  2. 2Hard to follow. Key information buried, missing, or diluted by excessive length. Significant effort to extract main points.
  3. 3Clear enough. Can understand the problem, approach, and results without undue effort. Core content clearly present: problem, method, findings, limitations.
  4. 4Well presented. Easy to follow, well-structured, appropriate level of detail. Target audience would get it quickly.
  5. 5Exceptionally clear. A pleasure to read. Complex ideas made accessible. Could serve as a model for how to present this type of work.

  1. This project presents VeilBench, an open-source benchmark for detecting sandbagging by comparing model responses across neutral, evaluated, and oversight framings. The methodology is sound: paired-framing design isolates oversight effects, and the 30-run validation on ransomware decryption (0% to 67% refusal under oversight, p < 0.001) demonstrates clear statistical rigor.

    However, the work faces challenges in novelty and utility. Prior work has already demonstrated oversight-dependent behavior in larger models (Anthropic system cards, Van der Weij et al. 2024), so the primary contribution is confirming this doesn't broadly occur in SLMs (7-17B range) and providing evaluation infrastructure. The benchmark's effectiveness is limited by the 1/17 scenario success rate. While this validates the methodology can detect sandbagging when present, it suggests most scenarios aren't properly calibrated or that sandbagging in SLMs is extremely rare and context-specific.

    The constraint to small models (acknowledged extensively) is significant, as strategic behavior may primarily emerge in larger models (70B+) where deployment concerns are greatest. Additionally, it's unclear whether the ransomware finding measures strategic deception versus normal safety training responding appropriately to oversight cues --without analysis distinguishing these interpretations, the safety implications remain ambiguous.

    The work would be strengthened by: testing on larger models to determine if sandbagging scales with capability, expanding scenarios to identify additional reliable detection cases, distinguishing strategic manipulation from expected safety responses, and including scenario descriptions in the appendix. Despite limitations, VeilBench provides well-documented, reproducible infrastructure that others can build on, with strong statistical practices and honest reporting setting a good standard for evaluation work.

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  2. This tackles a highly relevant problem. We definitely need stronger evaluations for oversight-dependent behavior. The core benchmark design makes sense, and I'd love to see it applied to a broader selection of models to stress-test the initial findings.

    A few suggestions: The write-up would benefit from

    - a clearer related work section to position the contribution

    - confidence intervals on the sandbagging scores, and

    - moving some technical detail to appendices to foreground the key findings.

    The dose-response analysis is a really interesting methodological angle, though I'd want more evidence that the different prompt framings actually constitute increasing "doses" of oversight signal.

    One small thing that would help a lot: a quick annotated walkthrough of a single scenario, defining all the key terms in context. That would make your write-up much more approachable.

Cite this project

@misc{zamagni2026veilbench,
  title = {{VeilBench}},
  author = {Francesco Zamagni},
  year = {2026},
  month = jan,
  note = {Submitted to AI Manipulation Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
  howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/veilbench-pb5u}},
  url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/veilbench-pb5u}
}

Build something like this at the next Sprint

AI Collusion Research Sprint · Oct 23 - 25, 2026