Faithful Adversarial MCTS for Persuasive COT Manipulation Check- A Cooperative AI Lens
Subramanyam Sahoo
Submitted to AI Manipulation Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
A Self Play x Monte Carlo Tre Search way For COT Manipulation Check
Reviews
It would have been helpful to provide example dialogues (and the evaluations of the LLM judge) in the document, so that I can get a sense of the format of them.
Minor nit: it would have been helpful if you cited the Persuasion for Good dataset you mention in the introduction.
1. (As acknowledged in the Limitations section) The sample size is too small (20 dialogues). That said the tournament methodology is fine, it's just very very small to draw any conclusions from.
2. you're trying to make the strategies interpretable, which I appreciate. But it's post-hoc pattern matching on embeddings. I want to see if you predict which Cialdini principles will emerge from the reward weights? It's more descriptive right now.
3. How do you know the COT is actually faithful versus the model just learned to produce plausible looking reasoning that scores well? You're using the same LLM to generate and judge.
Cite this project
@misc{sahoo2026faithful,
title = {{Faithful Adversarial MCTS for Persuasive COT Manipulation Check- A Cooperative AI Lens}},
author = {Subramanyam Sahoo},
year = {2026},
month = jan,
note = {Submitted to AI Manipulation Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/faithful-adversarial-mcts-for-persuasive-cot-manipulation-check-a-cooperative-ai-lens-813p}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/faithful-adversarial-mcts-for-persuasive-cot-manipulation-check-a-cooperative-ai-lens-813p}
}More from AI Manipulation Hackathon
- 1st placeView project: Who Does Your AI Serve? Manipulation By and Of AI Assistants
Who Does Your AI Serve? Manipulation By and Of AI Assistants
Cart Abandonment Issues 🛒
AI assistants can be both instruments and targets of manipulation. In our project, we investigated both directions across three studies. AI as Instrument: Operators can instruct AI to prioritise their interests at the …
- 2nd placeView project: Eliciting Deception on Generative Search Engines
Eliciting Deception on Generative Search Engines
Ardy
Large language models (LLMs) with web browsing capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial content injection—where malicious actors embed deceptive claims in web pages to manipulate model outputs. We investigate whether …
- 3rd placeView project: Cross-Linguistic Sycophancy in Frontier LLMs: A Benchmark Study
Cross-Linguistic Sycophancy in Frontier LLMs: A Benchmark Study
Talex
We developed a cross-linguistic sycophancy benchmark testing whether frontier AI models exhibit different manipulation behaviours across English, Japanese, and Bengali. Our results show significant language-dependent …